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Abstract
Traditional auction mechanisms support price negotiations on a single item. The 
Internet allows for the exchange of much more complex offers in real-time. This is 
one of the reasons for much research on multidimensional auction mechanisms 
allowing negotiations on multiple items, multiple units, or multiple attributes of an 
item, as they can be regularly found in procurement. Combinatorial auctions, for 
example, enable suppliers to submit bids on bundles of items. A number of 
laboratory experiments has shown high allocative efficiency in markets with 
economies of scope. For suppliers it is easier to express cost savings due to 
bundling (e. g., decreased transportation or production costs). This can lead to 
significant savings in total cost of the procurement manager. Procurement 
negotiations exhibit a number of particularities: 
–   It is often necessary to consider qualitative attributes or volume discounts in 
bundle bids. These complex bid types have not been sufficiently analyzed. 
–   The winner determination problem requires the consideration of a number of 
additional business constraints, such as limits on the spend on a particular supplier 
or the number of suppliers. 
–   Iterative combinatorial auctions have a number of advantages in practical 
applications, but they also lead to new problems in the determination of ask prices. 
In this paper, we will discuss fundamental problems in the design of combinatorial 
auctions and the particularities of procurement applications. 
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